Drone Hack: Spoofing Attack Demonstration on a Civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
August 1, 2012
By Daniel Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys Unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) used in the […]
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By Daniel Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys Unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) used in the […]
Spoofing tests against phasor measurement units demonstrate their vulnerability to attack. A generator trip in an automatic control scheme could be falsely activated by the GPS spoofing, possibly leading to cascading faults and a large-scale power blackout.
Just for the record: what is reported in “Detecting False Signals With Automatic Gain Control” (April GPS World) is what we introduced a long time ago and is reflected in one of our videos, and implemented in all of our GNSS receivers. AGC information is one of the four ways, and the least significant way, that we show interferences. There is a big difference between showing something in the laboratory and in some receivers, compared with having technology in mass production that everyone can understand and use. — Javad Ashjaee
A component of most GPS receiver front-ends, the automatic gain control (AGC) can flag potential jamming and spoofing attacks. The detection method is simple to implement and accessible to most GPS receivers. It may be used alone or as a complement other anti-spoofing architectures. This article presents results from a baseline AGC characterization, develos a simple spoofing detection method, and demonstrate the results of that method on receiver data gathered in the presence of a live spoofing attack.
Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS JammersGPS jamming is a continuing threat. A detailed understanding of how the available jammers work is necessary to judge their effectiveness and limitations. A team of researchers from Cornell University and the University of Texas at Austin reports on their analyses of the signal properties of 18 commercially available GPS jammers.
Disruption created by intentional generation of fake GPS signals could have serious economic consequences. This article discusses how typical civil GPS receivers respond to an advanced civil GPS spoofing attack, and four techniques to counter such attacks: spread-spectrum security codes, navigation message authentication, dual-receiver correlation of military signals, and vestigial signal defense. Unfortunately, any kind of anti-spoofing, however necessary, is a tough sell.
Disaster-preparedness plans recognize the individual’s role in his or her own survival. When storms approach, have water, food, and basic survival gear on hand. It takes time for help to arrive. The civil GPS industry faces an oncoming storm of interference, and the receiver is the first line of defense. As we integrate GPS into all facets of our lives and infrastructure, we become more subject to disruptions, both unintentional and intentional. Newark International Airport now sees several jamming events per day. In Taiwan, one airport experiences an average of 117 events per day!
Open-field tests of jamming signals from widely available in-car jammers, measured with an experimental software receiver that records the intermediate frequency (IF) samples, enable a detailed analysis of interference effects from these looming threats.
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