Modern GNSS will provide access control to the signal through spreading-code encryption and/or authentication at the navigation data level. This will require support within the receiver for secure cryptographic keys and the implementation of security functions. This article reviews vulnerabilities of these security functions, and reviews design considerations to mitigate attacks.
A single spoofing source has a different spatial signal distribution from the authentic GPS signal. An antenna array can estimate the spatial distribution of the received signal and thus discriminate the spoofing signal from the authentic one. Moving a handheld receiver with a single antenna during signal capture snapshots produces a form of a synthetic array, highly effective in discriminating spoofing signals sourced from a point-source jammer.
A portable spoofer implemented on a digital signal processor mounts a spoofing attack, characterizes spoofing effects, and suggests possible defense tactics. GNSS users and receiver manufacturers should explore and implement authentication methods against sophisticated spoofing attacks.
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